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What drives investment in wind energy? A comparative 
study of China and the European Union 
Abstract 
Although the expansion of new renewable energy has been dependent on support in state policies, the 
research literature has scant focus on the political motivations for implementing policies to stimulate 
such development. The growth of wind power is an illustrative case of renewables expansion, as this is 
the most mature of the new renewable technologies. What can explain the rapid development of wind 
power production capacity in the EU and in China, despite their very different political systems and 
basic preconditions? Applying the method of most-different systems design in combination with 
document studies and interviewing, this article demonstrates how large-scale investments in wind power 
have come about through a specific set of political motivations backed by strong governmental support 
policies with similar main aims: security of energy supply, creating future-oriented industries and 
employment, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local pollution. These three factors together, 
broadly perceived, might also explain the political motivations that drive large investment in new 
renewable energy sources elsewhere.
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1. Introduction  
Transforming the world’s energy systems to sustainable standards will require large-scale 
investment in renewable energy production (IPCC, 2014: 27–28). Today wind power 
technology is regarded as the most mature of the new technologies in renewables, with the 
potential to cover more than 20 % of global electricity demand by 2050 (IPCC, 2012: 539). 
Investment in wind power production may be taken as an illustrative case for examining what 
drives investment in renewable energy. Wind energy costs have decreased substantially in 
                                                          
1
 An earlier version of this paper has been published in Energy Procedia.  
2 
 
recent years, with grid parity
2
 being achieved in a growing number of markets, among them 
Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Portugal and the UK (see Randall, 2012; World Energy Council, 
2013: 11; IRENA, 2015b). The People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) and the 
European Union (hereafter EU) have enormous potential for increased production of wind 
power, given their long windy coastal expanses, large mountainous areas and plains with high 
winds (EEA, 2009; Lu et al., 2009). Both have made considerable investments in new 
renewable energy
3
 – wind power, bio power and solar power in particular – in the past decade. 
Several studies have investigated the expansion of wind power production in Europe or in 
China (see Lewis, 2007; Blanco and Rodrigues, 2009; Weber, 2010; Ru et al., 2012; Zhao et 
al., 2012; Zhou et al., 2012; Korsnes, 2014; Dai and Xue, 2014; Li, 2015), including the 
effects of various support mechanisms (Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). 
Lema et al. (2011) focus on competition and cooperation between the wind industries in 
Europe and China, whereas Lema et al. (2013) discuss the impact of China’s wind industry on 
the global wind industry. Analysing key participants’ motivations for wind energy innovation 
in China, Urban et al. (2012) conclude that important drivers are concerns about energy 
security and economic growth, and more recently also climate change. These findings are 
confirmed by Boyd’s document analysis (2012) of the political ideas driving renewables 
investment in China.   
 
Still, few studies have to our knowledge conducted causal comparative analyses to reveal 
what has spurred the large-scale development of wind energy production in the EU and in 
China. The field of energy studies has few comparative studies and interdisciplinary studies, 
or studies conducted by political scientists and innovation scholars (Sovacool, 2014: 12, 13, 
19, 20). This comparative interdisciplinary study addresses the overarching question of what 
types of politics can make policies on phasing in renewable energy achievable (see discussion 
of Sovacool, 2014: 21). Moreover, as pointed out by Aguirre and Ibikunle (2014: 375) there 
are few empirical studies of what influences renewables deployment, particularly worldwide. 
Several authors argue that political drivers are probably central in promoting renewable 
energy (e.g. REN21, 2014: 13), but studies on global samples of such political drivers have 
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been inconclusive. Some argue that climate concerns are important (Aguirre and Ibikunle, 
2014: 381–2), others that they do not matter (Marques et al., 2010: 6883); some studies hold 
that energy security is a key concern (ibid), others that is not a major determinant (Aguirre 
and Ibikunle, 2014: 382). In a commentary article, Jacobs (2010: 30) emphasizes energy 
security, climate concerns and job creation as key drivers behind renewables investment 
worldwide. As Schaffer and Bernauer (2014: 25) note, qualitative case studies are useful for 
demonstrating whether decision-makers take structural factors into consideration in deciding 
about renewables support policies. Thus we ask: What political motivations may explain why 
the EU and China, despite their enormous differences, have had similar large-scale expansion 
of wind power capacity in the past decade? We find that a combination of three predominant 
political motivations has been crucial in driving the implementation of policies necessary to 
stimulate growth in wind energy capacity: security of energy supply, creating future-oriented 
industries and employment, and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and local 
pollution.  
 
These motivations will probably be the same as or similar to those that drive new investments 
in renewables in general, as politicians tend to seek to satisfy broader societal targets when 
they create and implement policies on renewables. Moreover, with the comparative method of 
most-different systems design, there is a high likelihood that the results can be generalized to 
other countries and regions. As renewable energy production has often been more expensive 
than technologies for producing e.g. coal and nuclear power, it has required various types of 
governmental support for deployment and innovation – like access to cheap loans, laws 
granting access to the electricity grid, and research and development (R&D) funding. Here we 
focus on the political motivations behind the creation of such policies in the EU (perceived as 
one entity + its member states) and China. Building more wind power installations does not 
necessarily translate into stimulating innovation in wind-turbine technology, but the two 
factors are interconnected: a domestic market for wind power can nourish a domestic industry 
with considerable potential for learning and ultimately innovation (Lewis, 2007; Lewis and 
Wiser, 2007). Such innovation can drive system costs further down, facilitating large-scale 
deployment and thereby energy-system transformation by becoming a cost-competitive 
‘default’ technology. Support mechanisms are arguably essential for the early stages of a 
technology, to help it avoid the technological ‘valley of death’ and become commercial.    
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2. Method and data  
We draw on historical comparative analysis and the most-different systems design. This 
design singles out for comparison cases that have similar outcomes on the dependent variable, 
but different values on all independent variables of relevance to the outcome except, ideally, 
for one or very few. Similar values on that single (or small set of) independent variable(s) 
should be able to shed light on or even explain the similarities in outcome. This method is 
useful for minimizing the number of possible causes, since independent variables where the 
cases score differently can be eliminated as single causal factors (although they may still be 
involved in multivariate causation) (Gerring, 2007: 143). We hold that since wind energy 
technology has needed various types of stimulating measures to expand, and energy policy is 
a heavily regulated field, the motivations of political leaders have been central for expansion 
of production capacity. These motivations can be measured from primary and secondary 
sources like interviews, public policy documents, reports, speeches and academic literature.  
 
The EU and China have been chosen as cases of comparison, for several reasons. By 
definition, the EU is different from a nation-state – but as a political system/organization, it 
has strong federal features that make it comparable to national (not only federal) entities 
elsewhere. The EU is a relevant study object as regards wind power for various reasons: first, 
its member states have initiated large-scale investment in wind energy and have also fostered 
the leading manufacturers of wind energy equipment (GWEC, 2012). Second, the EU as a 
political organization is relevant because it is an organization where overarching climate and 
energy policies binding on the member states are created. Third, the EU has gained greater 
authority in the field of climate and energy (see Benson and Russel, 2014), although the 
ultimate power for making most decisions still rests with the member states. Recent expansion 
of wind-generation capacity in the EU is both a consequence of EU policies like the 
renewables requirements set for member states by the Renewables Directive (Directive 
2008/28/EC) and of national ambitions, as the EU as such has no land, no legislative authority 
and also no funding for constructing wind farms. Thus, focusing on both the EU and its 
member states is justified in terms of causality here.  
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Several factors make China a pertinent case for investigation. First, since 2010, it is the 
country with the world’s largest installed capacity for wind power production, although the 
EU, regarded as one unit, still ranks first. Second, Chinese wind energy equipment 
manufacturers now rank among the world’s largest (Jiang et al., 2011; GWEC, 2015a: 38, 44; 
REN21, 2015: 71). Third, for relevant comparison of the development and deployment of a 
technology until recently deemed expensive compared to traditional energy sources, the cases 
selected for study should have a considerable potential for large-scale use of this technology. 
Both China and the EU have ample wind resources (Lu et al., 2009) and have the world’s 
largest installed capacities. Thus they can serve as useful objects of study, influential cases 
particularly suited for shedding light on causal relationships of wider relevance (see Gerring 
2007: 108). 
 
The scope for generalization in the present study is potentially global: the causal relationship 
under scrutiny is in this type of design deemed valid across different regime types and levels 
of development. If we can isolate an operative cause of wind power expansion in both the EU 
(e.g. EU policies + EU28 policies) and China, that cause might be expected to apply to other 
political systems at national and international regional levels where there is high potential for 
renewable energy. There is, however, as George and Bennett (2005: 155–6) note, an inherent 
weakness with most-different case designs: cases with the same outcome might be discovered 
that do not have the same value on the variable(s) that survived the elimination procedure in 
the initial analysis. Therefore, in the discussion and conclusion section we assess whether the 
structural factors leading to the political motivations identified exist in other countries with 
large wind potentials and capacity for growth. We combine most-different systems design 
with causal analysis of influential cases using other case-study methods such as interviewing 
and document analysis to enable process tracing, as recommended by George and Bennett 
(2005: 156–60). This also meets the criticism of Gerring (2007: 140–2): that the most-
different systems design method does not provide sufficient grounds for causal analysis in 
itself. 
 
We focus on the period from around 1980 until 2015. In those years, modern wind-turbine 
industries were established in European countries and in China and, reaching technological 
maturity, started producing electricity in significant amounts (see Lew, 2000: 276; Kaldellis 
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and Zafirakis, 2011). Our dependent variable is installed wind power production capacity. The 
analysis is based on an extensive review of the literature, supported by 12 semi-structured 
interviews with professionals, experts and government officials connected to China’s wind 
industry (autumn 2011), and one interview with a professional representing the European 
wind industry (spring 2013). Interviewees in China were identified through online research, 
industry association lists and trade statistics and, most importantly, the snowball method. The 
underlying reasoning behind selecting particular interview candidates was to map the opinions 
of central actors in order to draw a representative picture of the motivations behind the growth 
of China’s wind industry. In order to confirm or contrast hypotheses based on the other data, 
we later (2013) contacted an interviewee representing the European wind energy sector. 
Concepts and methods are drawn from political science and from innovation studies.  
 
3. Wind power in China and in the EU 
3.1 The EU 
In Europe, the market for wind power grew steadily from the 1980s onwards. Denmark, with 
no hydroelectric power production and a populace negative to nuclear energy, was the first to 
invest in commercial-scale wind power. The introduction of explicit support mechanisms 
spurred the rapid expansion of Danish wind power in the 1980s (Pettersson et al., 2010: 3117–
8). Elsewhere in the EU, wind power expanded markedly after the introduction of feed-in 
tariffs (FiTs),
4
 in particular the 1990 electricity feed-in law (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz, StrEG) 
and a package of other measures in Germany in the 1990s. As this system, combined with 
other support mechanisms, made wind power the most attractive renewables technology in 
Germany at the time, most German expansion of renewable energy that decade came from 
this energy source. This development continued with Germany’s renewables law of 2000 
(Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG) (Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006: 267–8). Since 2000, 
other EU countries have also launched a range of support mechanisms to promote investment 
in wind power in order to expand their production capacity – especially Spain, the UK, France 
and Italy (REN21, 2015: 71). The European Union has also made renewable energy a core 
strategic priority. Measures have been launched to spur the production of renewable energy – 
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notably, the 2001 Renewable Electricity Directive (Directive 2001/77/EC)
5
 and the 2009 
Renewables Directive.
6
 The latter sets binding national targets whereby member states must 
expand their production and use of renewable energy so that by the year 2020, 20% of energy 
consumed in the EU will stem from renewable sources (Commission, 2009; 2010). The choice 
of support mechanisms and strategies is left to the individual member states, with some 
restrictions.   
 
To stimulate wind-capacity investment, most EU countries have chosen FiTs or similar 
systems, most notably Germany and Spain, but some have other main support mechanisms. 
For example, the UK and Sweden employ renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
7
 (REN21, 
2012: 70–73; 2014: 89). The EU has launched measures for stimulating wind-technology 
innovation and development. Wind technology is among the technologies chosen by the 
European Commission (hereafter: Commission) for focus in the European Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan (SET Plan), which includes the European Wind Initiative (EWI). The SET 
Plan is the ‘technology pillar of EU’s climate and energy policy’ (Commission, 2009b), while 
EWI is the result of a joint effort by the European Wind Energy Technology Platform (TP 
Wind), the Commission and member states (EWEA, 2010: 8). EWI is aimed at strengthening 
wind-related R&D through investments of approximately EUR 6 billion over a 10-year period 
in activities such as testing facilities for new wind turbine systems and prototypes for offshore 
structures (Commission, 2009b; 2010). The goal is for wind energy to supply the EU 
countries with 20% of their electricity needs by 2020, and 33% by 2030, in addition to 
creating 250,000 new jobs in the wind industry by 2020 (EWEA, 2010: 6, 2012d: 33). These 
policies are probably at least partially a result of political pressure. Szarka (2010) has found 
that advocacy coalitions of various interests have had major effects on wind power policies in 
Denmark, France, Germany, Spain and the UK. Moreover, Ydersbond (2014b) documents 
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that advocacy coalition lobbying across political levels may have been crucial to the 
ambitiousness of the Renewables Directive. 
 
Policies on wind power have had profound impacts: in 2012, total EU production capacity 
from wind energy passed the milestone of 100,000 megawatts (MW) and totalled 128,752 
MW by the end of 2014 (EWEA, 2012; 2015: 6). This is 14.1% of total EU generation 
capacity, and would in a normal year generate around 284 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity, 
covering 10.2% of all EU electricity consumption (EWEA, 2015b: 3).
8
 In Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, wind power constituted more than 10% of gross final electricity 
consumption (EWEA, 2013: 11). The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA, 
2015a), estimates there were 319,600 persons employed in the EU wind industry in 2013. 
This is a high-tech industry where European companies like Vestas, Siemens, Enercon and 
Gamesa are world leaders in R&D in new technologies (REN21, 2013: 50):  
[…] lots of renewable energy in general, but particularly wind energy is a European success story, the 
pioneering Spain, Germany and Denmark rule the world in terms of not just the finished turbines, but 
also in terms of components, in terms of expertise, in terms of the development of wind farms and the 
construction of wind farms […] (interview EWEA, 2013).  
Today the frontier of wind power technology is moving offshore: as of 2014, offshore wind 
covered approximately 1% of EUs electricity consumption (EWEA, 2015a: 10). The UK, with 
the EU’s greatest offshore wind potential, has become a particularly ambitious facilitator. As 
of 2015, it has a total estimated capacity of 5,054 MW offshore (UK Wind Energy Database, 
2015). Despite the financial crisis, installed capacity in the EU has generally shown a steady 
increase (EWEA 2015: 9). However, the crisis might have negative impacts on future growth 
in large-scale wind energy, in particular in countries hard-hit. Some governments have 
changed their support regimes and made them less predictable, which has led to investor 
uncertainty, less favourable investment conditions and lower deployment of wind energy 
(GWEC, 2014a: 48; EWEA, 2015b: 3,4). This was voiced by our interviewee from EWEA: 
‘Clearly, a map of the economic crisis and a map of where wind energy is being built out 
more or less fast is quite similar’ (interview EWEA, 2013). Figure 1 shows important policies 
on renewable energy, and capacity growth.     
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Figure 1: [about here]  
 
 
3.2 China 
China has pursued a double strategy of securing electricity generation from grid-connected 
turbines while simultaneously building up a manufacturing industry. Manufacturers began 
testing prototypes from 1985, but failed to commercialize them (Gan, 1998). The first 
subsidies for promoting wind power in China came with rural electrification programmes 
through small wind-farms in Inner Mongolia in 1986, where imported turbines were used. In 
the 1990s, the Ride the Wind Programme was introduced, and since the turn of the 
millennium various policies have been launched (see Figure 2) (Lew, 2000; Ru et al., 2012). 
Current support policies for solar and wind power include tax credits, FiTs, preferential land-
use policies and low-interest loans (Jiang, 2011; CGTI, 2012: 13). The authorities have also 
implemented other policies; for instance, China’s Renewable Energy Law (ReLaw), which 
entered into effect in 2006, requires power-grid operators to connect renewable energy 
production facilities to the grid, and mandates power companies to purchase renewable energy 
produced in their area (Government of China, 2005).    
 
China has increased its installed wind power capacity from a few turbines some twenty years 
ago to 114,763 MW as of the end of 2014, making it the leading wind market (GWEC, 2015). 
In 2013, this capacity generated 140 TWh, or 2% of total electricity generation in China 
(Pengfei, 2014). Since 2006, the wind industry has been growing almost exponentially: by 
2012, capacity exceeded that of five years earlier 24 times over (Interfax, 2012; Qiao, 2012). 
Most of this electricity is produced in the northernmost regions of China, whereas the major 
load (consumption) centres are located along the eastern coast. Therefore, much of the power 
produced must be transmitted long distances,
9
 entailing major challenges to electricity 
generators, wind-equipment manufacturers and the two grid companies, State Grid and 
Southern Grid. Introducing large amounts of intermittent power into the grid requires careful 
                                                          
9
 It is estimated that slightly more than half of all the electricity generated from wind in 2015 in China must be 
transmitted on long-distance lines, with the rest consumed locally (Ni and Yang, 2012: 38). 
10 
 
planning of a type that has been in short supply in China, as noted by several studies and 
reports (e.g. IEAwind, 2012). The grid infrastructure is the major bottleneck as regards 
production of wind energy: if it is to satisfy present and future needs, it will have to be 
developed and expanded to transport greater amounts of power, and managed more flexibly 
(see GWEC, 2012; Li et al., 2012a; Yang et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013a). The national 
government has set a target of 200 GW of installed capacity by 2020 (Li et al., 2012b). In fact, 
according to China Wind Power Outlook 2012, by 2020 capacity could soar to between 200 
and 300 GW (Li et al., 2012b). However, the industry is not yet mature and Chinese-made 
wind turbines have a poor track-record compared to those manufactured in Europe. Moreover, 
China lacks skilled personnel; and there have been accidents linked to inadequate training of 
employees and poor management (interview Azure International, November 2011). With the 
rapid development of the sector, this may change. Figure 2 shows how wind-capacity 
expansion has been accompanied by key policies on renewables.  
  
Figure 2: [about here]  
 
 
4. Driving forces 
The literature in political science and economics mentions several factors that might motivate 
political leaders to stimulate wind-capacity growth (see e.g. Jacobs, 2010; Fornahl, 2012). 
With China, likely political motivations can include poverty reduction, exploitation of 
macroeconomic comparative advantages like extensive manufacturing experience, using port 
infrastructure and access to cheap input factors such as labour, as well as increasing the 
number of market actors to enhance competition. In the EU, likely political motivations for 
investing in wind energy might include the desire to replace nuclear generation capacity, 
particularly after the Chernobyl and later the Fukushima nuclear accidents, and employing 
their mature high-tech industries. However, since the EU + EU28 and China score very 
differently on these variables, all must be ruled out in the elimination procedure of the most-
different systems design as necessary historical motivations driving wind energy growth in 
the past decade. Instead, we argue that the similarities in outcomes are due largely to three 
predominant political motivations, described in detail below: greater climate awareness and 
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reduction of local pollution, improving energy security, and creating jobs and boosting 
economic growth through high-tech leadership (see Table 1).    
 
Table 1: [about here]  
 
Sources: Commission, 1997:3; 2008; 2009a; 2009b: 2; 2011a; 2012; 2014c: 12; 2015b; NDRC, 2007: 11; State 
Council Information Office, 2007; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Jacobs, 2010; Ngan, 2010; interview Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance, 2011; Boyd, 2012; Fornahl et al., 2012: 845; HM Government, 2013; interview EWEA, 
2013; Zhang, 2013b:350-351; Wu, 2014; World Nuclear Association, 2015.    
 
4.1 Greater climate awareness and reduction of pollution 
4.1.1 The EU 
Climate awareness as a driver for investing in renewables gained in importance especially 
from the late 1990s, after state leaders had completed the Kyoto negotiations. There the 
Commission negotiated as one bloc on behalf of the EU member states, and the EU sought to 
achieve global environmental leadership by committing itself to large obligations to reduce 
GHG emissions. Since then, EU has aimed at being a global environmental leader (see 
Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008), launching various policies, not the least its Climate and 
Energy Package, which includes a strengthened version of the 2003 EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS), as well as the Renewables Directive and directives on CCS and a revised 
directive on fuel quality. Ambitious targets have been set, like reducing GHG emissions by 
80–95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels (Commission, 2011a: 3). Studies indicate that the 
EU has made its member states more ambitious regarding renewable energy (see Schaffer and 
Bernauer, 2014; Ydersbond, 2014a: 20). In October 2014, the member states agreed on new 
overarching climate and energy targets for the period 2020–2030, with at least 40% reduction 
in GHG emissions, at least 27% share of renewable energy at the EU level and an indicative 
target of at least 27% energy efficiency (Council, 2014). An overarching motivation was to 
have a credible and workable negotiating stance prior to the December 2015 global climate 
negotiations in Paris. 
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Several member state governments have highlighted GHG mitigation and economic 
restructuring towards a ‘green economy’, also before EU launched its policies. For example, 
Germany aims to rebuild the economy to make it sustainable (BMU, 2012). Moreover, 
Denmark has stated that all energy should stem from renewables by 2050. Sweden has set the 
target that its energy system is to be carbon-neutral by 2050. Germany has declared that that 
at least 80% of its electricity should come from renewable sources by 2050, as should 60% of 
final energy consumption; and that GHG emissions should be reduced by 80–95% (MD, 2008; 
Bundesregierung, 2010; Naturvårdsverket, 2012; BMU, 2011; DEA, 2014). Climate is 
declared a major concern in various EU documents highlighting the importance of renewables 
growth (e.g. Commission, 2011a). This is confirmed by our EU industry interviewee, who 
also underlined that other factors were important:  
One of them, of course, environmental reasons, but not singularly, there is also a lot of security of 
supply, the EU imports 70% of its energy needs. There is also an old thing about jobs and leadership, it 
is an industry where EU leads, and there are lots of considerations about hedging against volatility of 
fossil-fuel prices, so there are many considerations that are very explicit (interview EWEA, 2013). 
Our findings are confirmed by other research (e.g. Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; GWEC and 
IRENA, 2012: 26).  
 
4.1.2 China 
The Kyoto Protocol exempts China from commitments to reduce its GHG emissions. In 
international climate negotiations, China’s general stance has been that it should not be 
required to restrict its GHG emissions now, because it is still to be considered a developing 
country. Climate awareness has been increasing in China, as Economy (2010) and Stensdal 
(2014) point out. From 2007 onwards, climate change has become a national priority and 
mitigation issues are an important target in long-term central planning. The government has 
launched several policies as regards climate change. Most prominent of these is the Mid- and 
Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China of 2007, whereby non-fossil 
fuels are to cover 15% of final energy consumption by 2020 (NDRC, 2007; Economy, 2010). 
Stensdal (2014: 130) finds that these developments have been stimulated by an expert 
advocacy coalition consisting of various groups, including national and international 
environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs), scientists, and members of the 
National Advisory Committee on Climate Change (NACCC).  
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Since 2012, China has been the world’s largest emitter of GHGs in absolute terms, and has 
recently surpassed several Western countries (including the EU average) in terms of 
emissions per capita (BBC, 2014). Massive problems with pollution and environmental 
degradation at the national and not the least local level are also likely to have contributed to 
the greater focus on environmental issues in China. They cause severely increased mortality 
and morbidity, spurring considerable popular protest (Liao et al., 2010: 1879; Shapiro, 2012; 
CGTI, 2014: 23–4). ‘We will resolutely declare war against pollution as we declared war 
against poverty’, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proclaimed at the opening of the Parliament in 
March 2014 (Reuters, 2014). In a 2014 joint announcement with the USA, China for the first 
time announced official targets and responsibility in combating global climate change, and 
agreed to halt the increase in its national emissions by 2030 (White House, 2014). Also other 
studies (e.g. Boyd, 2012) note climate concerns as an important driver for renewables policy 
in China.   
 
4.2 Improving energy security 
4.2.1 The EU 
In contrast, EU energy consumption has basically stabilized, and the energy intensity of its 
economy is declining significantly (Commission, 2014b: 2). Few nuclear power plants are 
currently under construction. Scepticism towards nuclear power has increased, accelerating 
especially in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear meltdown (see Commission, 2012b: 6). 
Member state coal consumption has generally decreased over the past two decades, with some 
recent resurgence due to low world coal-market prices, caused mainly by the ‘shale gas 
revolution’ in the USA combined with low CO2 quota prices (Commission, 2012a). Still, EU 
countries remain heavily dependent on the import of fossil fuels, including coal: more than 
half of EU energy consumption is covered by imports from outside (Commission (2014b). 
Commission forecasts project growth in this relative dependence caused by lower 
consumption and higher prices (Commission, 2014d: 93).  
 
In the course of the past decade, the three Ukraine–Russia crises, severely threatening energy 
supply security in several Southern and Eastern EU member states, have moved security of 
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supply to the top of the political agenda. These situations have contributed to making 
diversification of energy supply an important target also in the EU and its member states (see 
Duffield, 2012; Commission, 2014b). Various measures have been undertaken to enhance 
energy security, partly in highly national-inspired ways by the member states – such as 
expanding energy import by constructing gas pipelines from Central Asia, Russia and Norway; 
building LNG terminals; reducing energy consumption; and stepping up domestic energy 
production from various sources (see Müller-Kraenner, 2008), and increasing domestic 
production of renewable energy such as wind power (see Bundesregierung, 2015; DEA, 2014; 
Ydersbond, 2014a). Numerous strategic EU documents highlight the importance of expanding 
renewable energy in order to improve security of energy supply (see Commission, 2011a; 
2011c; 2014c). Furthermore, enhancing electricity grid capacity domestically and between 
states is essential for ensuring a more stable energy supply (Commission, 2015a). This is also 
a key infrastructure issue that the EU emphasizes in seeking to create a single internal market 
for electricity and gas, as in the Commission’s energy infrastructure package (Commission, 
2011b). Several other studies (e.g. Nilsson et al. 2009) also identify energy security as a key 
driver for ambitious renewables policy at the EU level.   
 
4.2.2 China 
Chinese energy consumption has risen rapidly in the last decade, as a result of double-digit 
economic growth until recent years, population growth and urbanization (Jiang and Lin, 2012; 
WB, 2014). This economic growth has made China an ‘emerging economy’, although 
formally not a ‘developed country’. China is currently the world’s largest energy consumer, 
with its energy supply still based primarily on fossil fuels – coal and oil in particular (Wu, 
2014). The rapid rise in energy consumption has made China increasingly dependent on 
energy import (Müller-Kraenner, 2008; Andrews-Speed, 2012: 140; EIU, 2012; Jiang and Lin, 
2012; Mathews and Tan, 2014). Since 2009 China has been a net importer of coal, in 2012 
importing 8% of its total coal consumption. To reduce dependency on energy from abroad, 
Chinese authorities aim to diversify the energy supply, to be achieved in various ways – like 
seeking new supply routes and sources of petroleum, constructing new gas pipelines, and 
increasing the production of nuclear power (IEA, 2012; EIA, 2014). Another part of this 
strategy involves creating domestic industries and markets for renewable technologies like 
wind and solar power, to achieve large-scale expansion in domestic renewables (see Klare, 
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2008; Cao and Bluth, 2013; Mathews and Tan, 2014). This strategy has had effect: by 2014, 
China had become the world’s largest investor in renewable energy, and was number 1 in the 
world in adding capacity for wind power, hydropower, solar PV and solar water-heating 
(REN21, 2015: 20). Several recent studies confirm this, and hold that increasing energy 
security is a main concern for stimulating renewables growth in China (see Bambawale and 
Sovacool, 2011; Conrad and Meissner, 2011; Urban et al., 2012: 112, 121; Zhang et al., 2013a; 
Mathews and Tan, 2014).  
  
4.3 Boosting the economy and creating jobs  
4.3.1 The EU 
In 2011, the Commission (2011c: 5) noted: ‘European companies currently dominate the 
global renewable energy manufacturing sector, employing over 1.5 million people, with a 
turnover of over EUR 50 billion.’ If such growth continues, according to the Commission, this 
can create another million jobs and triple turnover in the sector. The EU aims to become a 
global leader in renewable-energy technology innovation, as stated inter alia in its Energy 
Roadmap 2050 (Commission, 2011a). Being the first in a new technology may entail various 
advantages for a region: its companies can gain market shares and develop specialized 
expertise that can yield additional benefits, creating efficient delivery systems at an early 
stage, and establishing brand names and solid reputations (see Teece, 1986). Studies have 
documented that Danish firms have become market leaders because of their first-mover 
advantage (Kamp et al., 2004; Lewis and Wiser, 2007). Wind energy investments in Germany 
and Denmark have long been motivated by leadership ambitions in the field, the desire to 
boost their economies and to create jobs (see BMU, 2012; Schmidt, 2012). The creation of 
‘green’ jobs also appears to be a key aim for EU member states in launching ambitions 
policies to stimulate the development of renewables capacity in general, as in Germany and 
Denmark (EFK, 2012; Bundesregierung, 2015).  
 
4.3.2 China 
Also Chinese political leaders appear motivated by concerns for the economy and for job 
creation (Beebe, 2011). Several interviewees reported that job creation was an important 
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motivation for developing the wind industry in China. As one interviewee from Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance explained (2011):  
From the government perspective they are going to have a huge employment problem, and a huge social 
stability problem, unless they can create new sectors that create jobs, and new avenues to ensure 
economic growth. This is one reason the government has supported China’s wind industry. 
China, the ‘workshop of the world’, has considerable experience in manufacturing all kinds of 
goods, and Chinese companies are generally keen to supply an item whenever a new demand 
arises. Furthermore, the government wants the country to be a global ‘greentech’ leader,10 and 
views investment in renewable energy as an historic opportunity to gain global market shares 
in renewable energy infrastructure production (e.g. Zhang et al. 2013b: 351). Over the past 
decade, the Chinese government has launched a range of policies to stimulate growth and 
innovation in wind power-related manufacturing and to enhance the capacity of wind power 
production. In 2010 it elevated renewable energy technologies to one of seven key strategic 
policy areas deemed vital for ensuring economic development, facilitating innovation, and 
promoting domestic technology development. This plan entails investing some USD 231 
billion in the wind sector alone between 2011 and 2020 (Pan et al., 2011: 14).  
 
As in Europe, wind investment appears to be an efficient labour-market strategy. Between 
2006 and 2010, growth in the industry created an additional 60,000–81,400 jobs directly for 
tasks such as operating wind turbines, and 32,000 jobs a year indirectly (Pan et al., 2011: 14). 
In 2013 there were 502,400 people employed in China’s wind industry, according to the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2015a: 6). With a working population of 
more than 915 million persons (South China Morning Post, 2015), 502,400 is a low share of 
the total workforce, but the figure is noteworthy, making China’s wind industry the largest in 
the world (IRENA, 2015a: 6). In 2014, USD 83.3 billion was invested in renewable energy in 
China (REN 21, 2015: 81) – a new record. According to estimates from IRENA (2015a: 4–8), 
China also has the largest number of employees in the world in solar PV, solar heating and 
cooling, small hydropower and large hydropower: ‘China has firmed up its position as the 
leading renewable energy job market with 3.4 million employed’ (IRENA, 2015a: 9). This 
rapid expansion has not come without new challenges. For example, there has been 
                                                          
10
 Greentech: technologies, products and services that deliver benefits to users of equal or greater value than 
those of conventional alternatives, while limiting the impact on the natural environment as well as maximizing 
the efficient and sustainable use of energy, water and other resources (CGTI, 2012: 9). 
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overcapacity for production of some renewable technologies in China, including wind-turbine 
manufacturing and manufacturing of solar photovoltaic panels (Zhang et al., 2013b: 343; 
Zhang et al., 2014: 908; GWEC, 2015a: 40; REN21, 2015: 62).  
   
5. From technology transfer to indigenous innovation 
The growth of wind energy in China and in the EU has not occurred entirely separately: the 
wind sectors in both places have had many mutually beneficial interactions.
11
 For instance, 
the Clean Development Mechanism, funded amongst others by several EU countries until 
2012, has helped to reduce the cost of additional wind power installations in China (Lewis, 
2010). Furthermore, China’s wind-turbine industry has been based on technology licensed 
from abroad, predominantly from German firms. Such licenses tend to be expensive, and the 
revenues are often invested in further R&D to create new competitive turbines – making it 
harder for Chinese market entrants to develop the best new technology on their own (Korsnes, 
2012). European wind companies have established production facilities in China because of a 
law in effect from 2004 to 2005 that required all turbines to consist of at least 50% 
components made in China; from 2005 to 2009, there was also a local content requirement of 
70% (Korsnes, 2014). Thus far, mergers and acquisitions between companies have not played 
a major role, but for some Chinese firms this has become an important strategy for tapping 
into global innovation networks (Ru et al., 2012; Silva and Klagge, 2013; Chen et al., 2014). 
For example, China’s Goldwind bought a majority share of Vensys’ stocks in 2008, and from 
then on participated more in R&D activities in Germany, where Vensys has its home base. 
  
Other factors that have stimulated technology transfer include reduced value added tax, extra 
funds for wind-turbine R&D, and collaboration between (some) research programmes in 
China and Europe for developing wind technology (Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Lewis, 2013). To 
date, Chinese turbines have had a poorer track-record and lower reliability than their 
European counterparts. China has now begun investing more in domestic R&D, leading Ru et 
al. (2012: 58) to conclude: ‘The innovation mode in China began with imitative innovation, 
then transitioned to cooperative innovation, and has more recently set its sights on attaining 
                                                          
11
 A general principle in comparative studies is that the units of comparison must be independent of each other 
(Lijphart, 1975, p. 171). Here, there are clear connections between the wind industries in the EU and in China. 
However, since such interaction has occurred mostly at the company level, we believe our general analysis 
remains valid.  
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truly indigenous innovation.’ Here, ‘indigenous innovation’ refers to Chinese companies 
owning the intellectual property, and potentially being able to design pioneering wind-turbine 
technology in the future. 
 
China’s grandiose entrance in the world renewables markets has had major consequences: As 
noted by Hearps and McConnell (2011), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), and others, 
the entry of Chinese manufacturers in renewable technologies like wind turbines and solar 
cells has pressed down global prices, due to economics of scale and harder competition. The 
relatively rapid price decrease has made these renewable technologies easier to access; and 
with grid parity rapidly approaching, further investment in the whole sector is spurred by the 
increasingly bright future prospects (see IRENA, 2015b). Lema et al. (2013: 39) conclude: 
‘[…] China is transforming the global wind power industry and challenging Western 
leadership in this green industry, but also providing new opportunities for cooperation.’  
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This study has explored why the political leaders in the EU + EU28 and China, despite their 
differences, have opted for large-scale investment in wind power during the past decade. 
Employing the method of most-different systems design combined with other case-study 
methods, our analysis has indicated that three factors shared by the EU and China have 
influenced the decision to establish national wind industries, and their goals for wind-
generation capacity. These three factors are: enhancing energy supply security, creating a 
domestic industry that provides future-oriented jobs, and taking action on mitigation of GHG 
emissions and local pollution.   
 
One way of investigating whether these drivers are important is to compare with other 
countries with sizeable wind power potential and expansion, like the USA, Russia, Brazil and 
India. Turning first to the basic energy statistics of these countries comparable in size to 
China and the EU, we find some indications to support our claim. As shown in table 2, CO2 
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emissions in China, EU27,
12
 the USA and India are all fairly high, and these countries all have 
large installed wind power capacity. They also have a relatively high proportion of coal-
power generation. Further, statistics on import dependency show that these heavily import-
dependent countries are the same ones that have invested in wind power. These figures prove 
that there are similarities amongst the large wind power countries. High import dependency 
and large GHG emissions are, of course, not enough to explain high growth in wind energy 
capacity, but they may be structural factors that serve to motivate political leaders.  
 
Table 2: [about here]  
 
Sources: GWEC, 2014a and b; IEA, 2014; OECD, 2014.  
 
Moreover, many studies indicate that all three arguments posited in this article have had 
impacts on sustaining the wind energy sectors of the USA and India (see Yergin, 2006; 
Bomberg and Super, 2009; Bang, 2010; National Academy of Engineering et al., 2010; 
AWEA, 2012; Bolinger, 2012; GWEC, 2012: 65; GWEC and IRENA, 2012; MNRE, 2012; 
2011). These motivations are especially strong when regions or states want to position 
themselves as environmental leaders, as is the case with the EU and the US state of California. 
Thus, all three groups of reasons appear well-supported by evidence from the literature.    
 
But – are all these factors equally important? And how do they relate to each other? GHG 
concerns were not a major issue for most countries until the late 1990s, whereas energy 
security concerns seem to have varied with countries’ differing energy needs as well as the 
global geopolitical situation. Boosting the economy might also vary with the differing 
challenges facing various countries, states and regions. Creating more jobs is normally seen as 
a pressing political issue when unemployment rates are high or expected to grow. Whether 
one motivation is ultimately more important than another is very hard to document, as all the 
motivations are frequently mentioned together in recent official documents, political speeches 
and elsewhere explaining the rationale for launching of ambitious policies on wind energy 
                                                          
12
 EU27 before Croatia joined, making the EU a union of 28 member states.  
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capacity growth. For instance, some analysts argue that energy security has been the most 
important internal driver behind China’s renewable energy expansion (e.g. Stahl and Schioppa, 
2013; Mathews and Tan, 2014). In this article, however, we seek to demonstrate that the three 
identified factors taken together are major motivations behind wind power developments in 
China and the EU, and probably also for investments in new renewable energy in the world in 
general. Instead of giving priority to only one or two concerns, we hold that all three must be 
taken into account to understand the political motivations behind renewable energy 
development at the global level historically. This may also explain why some countries seem 
reluctant to develop more renewable energy, despite ample renewable energy resources. Our 
findings should be tested by further studies employing various methods, a larger sample and 
additional data.  
 
Further, although political motivations are probably the ultimate drivers, various societal 
factors influence the pace and efficiency of policies that have been launched. These include 
permissions procedures for new wind-farms, the electricity market price, and the availability 
of skilled workers. Other data indicate that support may be reduced when political leaders see 
promoting renewables as ‘expensive’, as in times of economic crisis (e.g. interview EWEA, 
2013). This can happen regardless of the positive effects of such policies on employment, 
how much a country spends on subsidizing competing energy sources, and the actual long-
term economic effects. Thus, the future of renewable energy will also be influenced by what 
political leaders see as being most economic, politically correct and popular among domestic 
constituencies – as well as by the desire to ‘look good’ on the international arena in climate 
negotiations.  
 
The most important new renewable energy sources – wind and solar photovoltaic – are 
intermittent. Although they complement each other to some degree, profound infrastructure 
adaptations will be required for them to become the dominant energy sources. While they 
increasingly achieve grid parity, phasing them in will depend on political priorities until the 
infrastructure issues are solved. Over time, such priorities may become less important, 
especially if local production and storage of energy become widespread. As Yergin (2014) 
has shown, politics are volatile, and the energy policies implemented to follow up national 
political decisions have shifted considerably in the past decades – and in unexpected ways.  
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